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Since 1948, the United Nations has intervened in conflicts by means of peacekeeping 
operations. Not only were these operations often different in character, but time and again, 
the context in which they were deployed also differed. Nonetheless, one can distinguish a 
'generational' change of peacekeeping operations throughout history, not in the least because 
the United Nations does learn from lessons of the past. The purpose of this study is to provide 
answers to the following three research questions: 
1. To what extent do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute 
to 'durable peace'? 
2. How do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 
'durable peace'? 
3. How can these results be explained with reference to factors for success or 
failure? 
 
To answer these questions, a methodological framework for the evaluation of peacekeeping 
operations has been developed. By cutting-up the units of analysis, a more structured and 
focused comparison can be made. A UN peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects 
in this study is defined as a collection of 'policy tools' that may be used to contribute to 
durable peace. These tools can range from ceasefire monitoring to the organisation of 
elections. Durable peace is defined as the extent to which violence is absent and the extent to 
which the 'causes of conflict' are addressed It is divided into eight variables: negative peace 
and seven clusters of the causes of conflict - inter-group relations; group demography; state 
weakness; state unwillingness and good governance; state/government legitimacy; unemployment 
and economic decline; and external relations. These clusters are distilled from the literature 
and are analysed through the use of conflict indicators.1 
Within the methodological framework for the evaluation of peacekeeping operations, the 
developments with regard to each variable are reviewed through the periods of ante-presence 
(five years), and presence and post-presence (again five years); subsequently, an assessment is 
made of the extent to which and how the policy tools contributed to these developments. The 
relationship between a policy tool and a variable of durable peace is only reviewed if the 
policy tool was intended to contribute to durable peace according to the mandate of the opera-
tion, if it is expected to contribute according to the literature, or, if in practice it contributed -
while this was unintended by the mandate or unexpected according to theory. Subsequently, 
for the purpose of the structured, focused comparison2 of the case studies, eight hypotheses are 
formulated in which it is expected that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building 




Correspondingly, a comparison of the four cases of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-
building aspects - the second generation of peacekeeping operations - can be made in a 
structured, focused manner. These four cases are Cambodia (UNAMIC and UNTAC), 
Mozambique     (ONUMOZ), Rwanda   (UNAMIR), and   El   Salvador (ONUSAL). The 
four selected cases are the only ones that meet the following criteria: the United Nations was 
the lead organisation in the peacekeeping operation; the operation was deployed between 
1989 and 1997; the operation was based on a peace agreement; and the operation was 
deployed in an intrastate conflict. 
Cambodia: From 1991 to 1993 the United Nations was present in Cambodia with two 
operations, UNAMIC and UNTAC. Both operations aimed to implement the Paris 
Agreements between the Khmer Rouge, the Phnom Penh regime, the royalist FUNCIN-PEC 
and the republican KPNLF. The Cold War had come to an end, and the major powers 
supported a solution for the Cambodian conflict that would allow them to distance 
themselves without loss of face. Unfortunately, the deployment of the operation was sluggish 
and its implementation too weak according to the Khmer Rouge, which led this party to 
withdraw from the peace process. The remaining parties decided to continue, which resulted 
in the more or less full demobilisation and disarmament of the republicans and royalists and 
the successful organization of elections. Although the royalists won the elections, the Phnom 
Penh regime managed to retain its position in government through the threat of violence. The 
resulting coalition government continued to struggle for some years against the Khmer 
Rouge, but without the support of China, Thailand and the population, this organisation was 
eventually doomed to waste away, Nowadays, Cambodia is a peaceful, albeit very weak 
democracy.3 
 
Mozambique: ONUMOZ was deployed from 1992 to 1994. The aim of the operation was to 
assist in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, which was signed in Rome by 
the FRELIMO government and RENAMO. Although the conflict in Mozambique had only 
partly been related to the Cold War, the peace process was able to ride the wave of its end. 
More importantly, however, was the fact that in the meantime the apartheid regime in South 
Africa had come to an end and Pretoria started to cooperate with Frontline States, such as 
Mozambique. As a consequence, RENAMO lost an important cornerstone of its strength. 
Nonetheless, even until after their start, the participation of RENAMO in the elections 
remained uncertain. The demilitarization of the country was eventually nearly complete. 
Though Mozambique would certainly not become a textbook example of a well-functioning 
democracy, the struggle between RENAMO and FRELIMO was in the end continued within 
the political arena.4 
 
Rwanda: In 1993 UNAMIR was deployed on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This 
agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF was very detailed on many 
aspects, but did not provide the United Nations with a role on many essential issues such as 
human rights and elections. In addition to France, no other major power was interested in the 
developments in Rwanda. This expressed itself in the size and mandate of the operation. At 
the same time, although President Habyarimana had signed the agreement under heavy 
pressure from the international community, a large share of his supporters fiercely opposed it. 
After the civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi flared up again in neighbouring Burundi, 
relations in Rwanda also polarized sharply. When subsequently President Habyarimana was 
killed after his plane was shot down, the Hutu elite, out of fear of losing their position and 
with overwhelming support from the Hutu population, started to perpetrate genocide on the 
Tutsi. Next, UNAMIR and the rest of the international community stood by and watched 
from the sidelines while about 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered, and the genocide was only 
eventually ended by the RPF when it took over power. In spite of the fact that UNAMIR 
remained in Rwanda until 1996, with the genocide it lost its aim to implement the Arusha 
Agreement. Under the authoritarian regime of the RPF, the tensions between the Tutsi and the 
Hutu were not removed, but merely suppressed. Nonetheless, there is relative negative peace 
in Rwanda for the time being, albeit at the cost of stability in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.5 
 
El Salvador. ONUSAL commenced in 1991 before the 1992 Chapultepec Agreement was 
reached. In addition to the human rights component, the rest of the operation was also 
deployed after the signing of this agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the 
FMLN. Although there was no confidence between the parties for a long period and the 
implementation of the accord had to be continuously renegotiated, in the end El Salvador was 
demilitarised. This result was reached in spite of the fact that during the process secret arms 
caches of the FMLN were discovered and some of the right wing found it difficult to leave 
the era of the death squads behind. In 1995, ONUSAL was eventually closed after the FMLN 
had successfully made the transition from rebel organisation to political party, which 
participated fully in a peaceful and democratic country.6 
 
To what extent do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute 
to 'durable peace'? 
 
Opposed to the tenor of public opinion, the conclusion arising from a comparison of the 
above four cases is that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects do make a 
positive contribution to durable peace. Firstly, this is the case for the individual operations. In 
El Salvador, the contribution of ONUSAL to durable peace was positive in many areas. In 
those areas where it did not contribute, contribution was not intended. The operation made 
both a little positive and a little negative contribution to the variable of state weakness. The 
negative contribution, the lack of capacity of the police force to combat the crime wave, was 
temporary, while the positive contribution was more durable. Also in Mozambique the 
contributions of ONUMOZ to durable peace were positive. It was remarkable in this case 
that, although unintended, the operation made both a minor positive and a minor negative 
contribution to the variable of inter-group relations. In Cambodia, it was striking that the 
contribution was positive to the two variables which were not intended to be addressed by 
UNTAC.  
 
Contribution of peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects  
 
 Cambodia Mozambique Rwanda EI Salvador 
Negative peace + ++ 0 ++ 
Inter-group relations ++b +/-b 0 ++ 
Group demography -- ++ + a + 
State weakness ++ + a + a +/-a 
State unwillingness 
and good governance
+ a + a 0 ++ 
State/ government 
legitimacy 
++b ++ Ob ++ 
Unemployment and 
economic decline 
++ +/- Ob Ob 
External relations ++ ++ + a Ob 
+ Minor positive contribution 
++ Positive contribution 
- Minor negative contribution 
-- Negative contribution 
+/- Not clearly negative or positive contribution 
0 No contribution 
a Contribution was only temporarily 
b Variable was not intended to be addressed 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the operation made a negative contribution to the variable 
of group demography. Even in the worst case, Rwanda, a minor and only temporary, though 
far from insufficient, positive contribution was made. The fact that the contribution was only 
temporary resulted from the genocide and its aftermath. As most critics of UNAMIR argue, 
the reason the contribution of the operation was only minor and temporary was not because 
the operation did not have a positive influence, but rather the opposite - more was needed: a 
larger, stronger, tougher and more comprehensive operation. Not only do UN peacekeeping 
operations with peace-building aspects contribute positively to the different cases, but it has 
to be noted that they generally also make a positive contribution to the different variables of 
durable peace, negative peace and the causes of the conflict. In other words, the eight 
hypotheses formulated within the context of the methodological framework are confirmed. 
The extent of the positive contribution to the variables does, however, differ. The 
contribution proves to be particularly positive with respect to the legitimacy of the state and 
government. The contribution to negative peace and the improvement of external relations is 
also clearly positive. Operations contribute the least to the addressing of economic causes 
and demographic problems. Nonetheless, UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building 
aspects often do not intend to address the economic causes, although, if they are mandated to 
do so, they generally prove to be relatively successful. The lesser results with regard to the 
variable of group demography result mainly from the fact that if repatriation is not followed 
by the sufficient reintegration of refugees, it can increase demographic pressure. 
Furthermore, it is remarkable that the contribution of operations with regard to the addressing 
of weakness of the state and the stimulation of good governance is sometimes only 
temporary. Finally, it is rather rare that an operation as a whole contributes negatively to the 
developments with regard to one of the variables of durable peace. It is, however, more 
common for individual policy instruments to make negative contributions to the variables of 
durable peace, but in such cases these contributions are generally compensated for by the 
positive contributions of other policy instruments. 
 
How do UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute to 'durable 
peace'? 
 
The different peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects contribute or intend to 
contribute through the policy tools implemented in the operations. In the four case studies 
surveyed, 25 different policy tools were used. Not all of these different policy tools were 
actually implemented in each operation and if they were, they did not always have the same 
contribution to durable peace. In the four case studies, a relation or intended relation between 
an implemented policy tool and a variable of durable peace existed a total of 115 times. 
 
The areas of attention 
The policy tools used in UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are mainly 
directed at the military, strength of the state and governance issues, and at the directly visible 
demographic consequences of conflict. They are much less directed at the social, economic 
and external causes of conflict. 
It is remarkable that more than half of all the 25 instruments implemented contributed or 
intended to contribute to negative peace. Furthermore, many policy tools contribute or intend 
to contribute the variables of state weakness, and state unwillingness anti good governance. 
Although not many policy instruments contribute or intend to contribute to the variable of 
group demography, those instruments that do - mine clearance, repatriation, and reintegration 
of refugees -are implemented frequently. Consequently, operations also devote, relatively 
speaking, a lot of attention to this subject. Only a few instruments contribute or intend to con-
tribute to inter-group relations, state/government legitimacy, unemployment and economic 
decline, and external relations. The positive or negative contributions of the implemented 
policy tools to these variables are even often not intended. 
 
The proportion of attention and results 
 The fact that a certain area receives a lot of attention does not mean that they are also the 
areas where the contribution is most positive. The terrain where UN peacekeeping operations 
with peace-building aspects score best - die legitimacy of the state and government - receives, 
if at all, only the attention of a few policy tools. This positive contribution of the operations as 
a whole is therefore borne by only a small number of policy instruments. This underlines the 
importance of those instruments: institution building, the organisation of elections and 
election monitoring. This is also the case with the few instruments that are implemented to 
improve external relations. At the same time, it is remarkable that if one keeps in mind how 
much attention is provided to positively influence negative peace, the contribution of the 
policy instruments is actually relatively small. Finally, it is striking that the results in another 
field which receives much attention, group-demography, are actually the least positive. 
 
The most striking instruments  
The instruments that have the greatest chance to deliver a positive contribution are not 
implemented most frequently. The instruments which generally have the greatest chance to 
make a positive contribution are reintegration of ex-combatants, institution building, 
verification of foreign forces withdrawal, winning the hearts and minds of the local 
population, providing pay to the newly formed national army, human rights verification, 
human rights education, truth commissions, the organisation of elections and election 
monitoring. With regard to the most successful relations between the implemented policy 
instruments of UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects and the variables of 
durable peace, it has to be said that none of the policy tools was implemented in all four cases 
with a positive result. Only the relationship between election monitoring and the variable of 
state/government legitimacy was, in the three cases where the instrument was implemented, 
positive. Although also very positive, the relations between the organisation of elections and 
institution building with state/government legitimacy, the verification of foreign forces 
withdrawal with external relations, humanitarian aid with group demography and institution 
building with negative peace are less frequent. It is not uncommon for a policy tool to be 
implemented with the aim of making a positive contribution but fail to do so. The instrument 
that catches the eye in this respect is civilian police monitoring, which was applied four times 
with the intention of contributing towards the improvement of good governance, but failed to 
do so all four times. The contribution of disarmament to the strengthening of the state does 
not perform much better. 
Finally, it is striking that policy instruments sometimes make a negative contribution to the 
variables of durable peace. Important examples of such negative relations are, if not followed 
by sufficient reintegration of the ex-combatants and the refugees respectively, the contribution 
of cantonment and demobilisation on the variables of state weakness and unemployment and 
economic decline, and of repatriation on the variable of group demography. This only 
emphasises the need to improve these tools. 
 
How can factors for success and failure explain these results? 
 
Nine factors for success and failure can be distilled from the structured, focused comparison 
to explain the differences in contribution by UN peacekeeping operations with peace building 
aspects. The probability that such an operation makes a positive contribution to durable peace 
increases if it meets the factors given below. 
The parties are willing and sincere. For the conflicting parties to be sincere, they must view 
the continuation of the conflict as an unwanted possibility and the durable peace provided by 
the peacekeeping operation as the best alternative. The reason why willing-ness and sincerity 
are needed is that peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects are not mandated, 
prepared, equipped or sized for peace enforcement actions. Moreover, even if one can start 
building peace, if the parties only hope to restart the conflict once the United Nations leaves, 
the results cannot be lasting. 
The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties. A short term 
danger is lurking at the start of the operation, because although the parties may view the 
projected durable peace as the best alternative, the road towards that future will be perceived 
as, and often is, a bumpy one. The conflict and the history extending far before the conflict 
have often created a perception amongst the parties that the other party is not to be trusted 
and that one has to provide for one's own security against the threat of the other. In order to 
stop this spiral and to enable disarmament and demobilisation, an operation needs to provide 
alternative sources for a sense of security. Parties generally perceive their security to increase 
if the cease-fire is monitored by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and robustly 
mandated force. 
The operation has sufficient attention for the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth. 
One can perhaps reach negative peace, but if the causes of conflict persist, it will eventually 
flare up again. The probability that an operation sufficiently addresses the causes of conflict 
increases if more of these causes are addressed - the breadth - and if more attention is given 
to each cause - the depth. If not all causes receive sufficient attention, the chances increase 
that the conflict resumes and previously addressed causes intensify again, therefore undoing 
the work that has already been done. In the short term, however, the lack of good governance 
and legitimacy of the state or government are especially important causes of conflict to be 
addressed 
The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties. In particular, 
the support of the permanent members of the Security Council is important because they 
need to accept the necessary resolutions and mandate; in addition, they may need to pressure 
proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighbouring countries is essential because 
these countries often support one of the parties and the implementation of certain policy tools 
requires their assistance. 
The operation is deployed in a timely fashion and at the right time. If the timing is right, a UN 
peacekeeping operation with peace-building aspects can aid and play an accommodating role. 
If the conflict is not yet ripe, the role of an operation is much more limited because UN 
peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects seem to be less able to ripen conflicts. 
Furthermore, the interval between the signing of a peace agreement and deployment of the 
operation should be kept to a minimum in order to maintain the momentum for peace. 
The operation has at its disposal competent leadership and personnel and clear command 
structures. The leadership is especially important with regard to the continuing mediation role 
during the presence of the operation. Furthermore, competent personnel are the foundation 
for each policy tool. Moreover, command structures are also important, especially in extreme 
situations. 
The operation is part of a long term approach. In order to contribute sufficiently to negative 
peace and especially to the addressing of the causes of the conflict, time is needed. 
Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that many of these processes may be started 
by a peacekeeping operation, but cannot be finished within the period of its presence and 
therefore need to be embedded in a wider approach. In the absence of sufficient follow-up, it 
is likely that the short period of presence is not enough to allow durable changes to take root, 
and the contribution is likely to be only temporary in such a situation. 
Within the operation and externally, the different 'policy instruments' are co-ordinated. The 
implementation of many policy tools depends on the implementation of other policy tools. 
Coordination between them is essential for optimum implementation. There are two main 
problems in this respect. First, important processes are sometimes rushed in order to be 
completed in time for another. Second, two complementary policy tools fail to link up with 
each other, and consequently too much time may elapse between these two linked processes. 
External co-ordination is indeed another important factor. Again there are two main 
problems. First, if all these actions are insufficiently co-ordinated with other organisations 
present in the field, they may thwart each other. Second, lack of co-ordination with the 
organisation taking over the task after departure of the operation may badly affect the 
sustainability of the contribution 
The operation provides ownership. ‘Ownership’ is important both during and after the 
presence of the operation. Parties, in the end, need to be enabled to decide for themselves 
what they deem necessary in order to ensure that the operation does indeed deliver what they 
require it to. After the departure of the operation, the former conflicting parties and the 
population must view and feel the contribution to be something they want to maintain.   
 
Concluding remarks 
In the end, one can concluded that UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects 
contribute to durable peace. There remains, however, a lot of room for improvement. Not 
only can individual policy tools still be improved, but the above factors for success and 
failure are also frequently ignored. Taking these factors into consideration would enhance the 
chances for success for UN peacekeeping operations with peace-building aspects and most 
likely for peacekeeping operations in general. 
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